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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Sangyoon Shin, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014 
 
Instead of focusing on individual network attributes, such as centrality or constraint, and 
their respective effects on performance, this study investigates the overall advantage that results 
from holding a network position (i.e., composite structural advantage) and its effect on 
performance at the syndicate level. Specifically, in the context of venture capital syndication, it 
investigates a syndicate’s composite structural advantage and suggests its positive effect on 
syndicate performance. Moreover, this study examines two moderating factors to this 
relationship. Composite structural advantage diversity within a syndicate is suggested to weaken 
the positive effect, while the lead venture capital firm’s reputation is proposed to strengthen it. 
Two-stage least squares analyses, with 1,137 venture capital syndicate investments, confirmed 
the predicted effect of composite structural advantage and the negative effect of composite 
structural advantage diversity on the relationship. However, the lead venture capital firm 
reputation showed the opposite result from the expectation. The reputation weakened the positive 
effect of composite structural advantage on performance, as did composite structural advantage 
diversity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Social network researchers have investigated various network attributes of an actor’s 
structural position such as centrality (Freeman, 1979), closure (Coleman, 1988), density (Scott, 
1991), and brokerage (Burt, 1992). However, a position within a network possesses multiple 
attributes that potentially bring conflicting effects on performance. For example, a position with 
a high level of centrality may increase performance, while the same position decreases 
performance via its low level of brokerage. In spite of this inconsistency, limited research has 
addressed the network position as a whole with a comprehensive construct reflective of overall 
advantage. Researchers have recently started to focus on overall advantage that results from 
holding a network position (e.g., Burt, 2010; Burt, Kilduff, & Tasselli, 2013; Greve, Rowley, & 
Shipilov, 2013).  
However, there has not been a widely-accepted agreement about what this relatively new 
construct actually represents and how it is to be measured. For example, Burt (2012) considered 
network advantage as overall increase of performance and measured it as the number of non-
redundant ties and network constraint in his research about virtual networks. Nevertheless, he 
also argued that network advantage is closely associated with both status and network constraint 
(Burt & Merluzzi, 2013). Greve et al. (2013) suggested network advantage as a more concrete 
construct with a number of field-based examples. According to them, network advantage refers 
to competitive advantage that a focal actor’s network position brings, and is composed of three 
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key elements: better cooperation, superior information, and increased power (Greve et al., 2013). 
However, there was a limitation in that they did not propose a concrete measure of this construct. 
As their network advantage includes advantages both from a specific position in the network 
structure and from specific partners, the operationalization seems to be in need of refinement. 
This study suggests a subset of network advantage as a new construct which is worthwhile to 
investigate. This construct is solely about structural advantage that results from holding a 
position within a network. Then, three structural attributes in a network are combined to form a 
comprehensive measure to represent three components of Greve et al.’s network advantage 
(2013). This study proposes to call this new construct as composite structural advantage 
(hereafter, CSA).  
Then, CSA is suggested to play a meaningful role in the focal actor’s performance as 
does network advantage. Prior research has shown that network advantage increases the focal 
actor’s performance (Burt, 2010; Greve et al., 2013). However, this raises another issue 
depending on the focal actor’s type. If a study is about network advantage of an individual, that 
study focuses on the network advantage the individual’s network position brings (Burt, 2010). If 
another study is about network advantage of an organization, then, that study focuses on the 
network advantage the organization’s network position brings (Greve et al., 2013). In both these 
cases, the network advantage level directly increases the focal actor’s performance. Critically, in 
both these instances - reflective of the vast majority of studies – the focal actor is unitary (i.e., a 
single individual or organization). However, what if the focal actor is a group composed of 
multiple members who are themselves unitary actors? For instance, what if the focal actor is 
either a team composed of individuals or a syndicate composed of organizations? As previous 
studies at the unitary actor levels have shown, will the group’s network advantage level, more 
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specifically, its CSA level, still increase its performance? Will there be any contingency factor 
governing the relationship between the group’s CSA level and its performance? These 
considerations were developed into my research questions: How does a group’s CSA level affect 
its performance? What factors will moderate the relationship between a group’s CSA level and 
its performance?  
This study addresses these research questions in the context of a syndicate of which 
members are organizations. More specifically, venture capital (hereafter, VC) syndication is 
investigated as the context of this study. A VC syndicate refers to a temporary group of two or 
more venture capital firms (hereafter, VCFs) that have the purpose of financial investment in a 
venture company (i.e., a start-up company). Recently, researchers have begun to show more 
interest in VC syndication, not only because it is a major form of VC investment (Tian, 2012), 
but also because it provides a rich empirical setting for investigating interorganizational ties 
(Podolny, 2001; Echols & Tsai, 2005). This study investigates CSA level of a VC syndicate and 
its effect on the syndicate’s performance. The level is suggested to increase performance as 
previous studies at the unitary actor levels have shown. With regard to the second research 
question, the composition of the members’ CSA levels may affect the group’s performance. 
Moreover, the characteristics of the member that plays the role of the group’s leader can affect 
the group’s performance. Thus, this study looks into these two moderating factors. More 
specifically, this study investigates CSA diversity within a syndicate and the lead VCF’s 
characteristics. CSA diversity refers to how diverse a group’s members are in terms of CSA 
level. This factor is suggested to weaken the positive effect of CSA level on performance. The 
other moderating factor this study examines is the lead firm’s reputation. Although the lead VCF 
plays a dominant role in the VC syndicate’s investment (Wright & Lockett, 2003), it has not 
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received the attention it deserves. A reputable lead VCF is hypothesized to enhance its 
syndicate’s performance by increasing the positive effect of the syndicate’s CSA level. Figure 1 
illustrates the research model. With regard to a venture company’s success, both company 
characteristics and VC characteristics will be critical determinants. For example, quality of the 
entrepreneurs, knowledge, technologies, and initial resources will play an essential role in the 
company’s success. However, this study mainly investigates VC’s characteristics as the focus, 
while controlling for the venture company’s characteristics in the analyses. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Research Model: CSA Level, CSA Diversity and the Lead VCF’s Reputation  
on the Venture Company’s IPO Success 
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This study makes three primary contributions. First, it contributes to social network 
research. Although network advantage has recently started to receive more attention as the 
overall benefit that results from holding a network position, there has not been a widely-agreed 
view about what it really means and how to measure it. This study suggests a subset of network 
advantage as a new construct (i.e., CSA) which represents the structural benefits (i.e., 
information, cooperation, and power from holding a network position) that result from three 
network attributes: brokerage, direct ties, and power centrality. Moreover, this study addresses 
CSA at the syndicate level. Although previous research has shown the effects of network 
advantage at the unitary actor level (i.e., the levels of individual and organization), network 
advantage of a group such as a team or a syndicate may make distinct influences. This study 
focuses on a syndicate’s CSA and demonstrates its effect on performance. Second, this study 
extends the understanding of diversity research by introducing CSA diversity. This diversity 
within a syndicate is shown to play a critical role as a moderating factor impacting the 
relationship between CSA level and performance. Third, this study directs attention to the lead 
organization as a determinant of syndicate performance. While research on the leader’s influence 
has been a popular theme in the management field, interest in the lead organization has been 
limited. This study demonstrates the importance of the lead organization to its syndicate by 
indicating the lead firm reputation’s moderation on the relationship between CSA level and 
performance.  
The study is organized as follows. First, I review relevant literature related to network 
attributes, venture capital syndication, diversity, and reputation. Then, I develop the hypotheses. 
In the next part, I describe the research design including sample, data, and variables. Then, I 
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explain the statistical analyses and results. Finally, conclusions, contributions, limitations, and 
future directions are presented.  
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II. THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this part, I review relevant literature related to network attributes, CSA, venture capital 
syndication, diversity, and reputation. After the review, I develop the hypotheses on the basis of 
the literature. 
 
 
 
1. Network Attributes and Composite Structural Advantage 
 
Every actor in a network maintains relationships with his/her alters. Actors and the 
relationships with their alters constitute the social network. One stream of social network 
research has emphasized the strength of links within a network (i.e., the relationships among 
actors). In his seminal article, Granovetter (1973) suggested the benefits of a weak tie as a source 
of novel information from disparate parts within a network. On the other hand, Krackhardt 
(1992) emphasized a strong tie as a base of trust in an uncertain environment. He argued that 
strong ties reduce resistance to change and provide support in the case of severe change. Also, 
contingency factors were suggested to govern the effects of tie strength. For example, strong ties 
are more beneficial in the exploitative context, while weak ties bring better performance in the 
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exploratory context (Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). This research stream shows that the 
strength of ties affects the actors’ choices among possible actions and their performance.   
Other social network researchers have focused on the functions of a network. These 
second stream researchers symbolized the functions as 1) pipe, 2) bond, and 3) prism (Podolny, 
2001; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). The researchers of the first group looked into flows via network. 
A network works as channels through which knowledge (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), 
information (Koka & Prescott, 2002), innovative outputs (Ahuja, 2000), management practices 
(Davis & Greve 1997), and resources (Uzzi, 1996, 1997) flow. The second group of researchers 
focused on power created from the linked actors. Emerson (1962) pioneered to consider a 
network as a nexus where power resides by explaining reciprocal power-dependence relations 
within a network. Cook and Emerson (1978) conducted experimental studies about exercising 
power in exchange networks. These studies investigated power creation within a network and 
uneven allocation of the power to the members. Meanwhile, other researchers in this group 
emphasized the total power shared by the members that form a network (Powell, 1990; Jones, 
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Borgatti and Halgin (2011) reviewed relevant literature of this group 
and explained differences between the network as pipe and the network as bond. The third group 
of researchers considered a network as a prism that helps audiences evaluate the focal actor’s 
quality (Podolny, 1993) and legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1992). In particular, this perspective 
enabled researchers to further develop social status research by considering a network as a source 
of status as well as the indicator (e.g., Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; Podolny, 2001). 
Another stream of social network research has addressed the structure of a network. This 
stream can be categorized into two groups as well. The former has focused on structural 
characteristics of a whole network such as density (Friedkin, 1981; Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & 
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Kraimer, 2001), centralization (Freeman, 1979; Sparrowe et al., 2001; Bunderson, 2003), and 
small world characteristics (Milgram, 1967; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). The latter has shown interest 
in a focal actor and the actor’s structural position within a network. However, there has been less 
effort to look into the structural position within a network as a whole. Instead, researchers have 
explained the distinct consequences of holding a position within a network by investigating the 
position’s individual attributes such as centrality, closure, density, and brokerage (e.g., Freeman, 
1979; Coleman, 1988; Scott, 1991; Burt, 1992). Compared to other network attributes, centrality 
has been consistently shown to increase performance such as innovative output (Powell et al., 
1996; Tsai, 2001), new tie formation (Powell et al., 1996; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), and power 
(Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; Ibarra, 1993). However, other attributes have shown mixed results in 
terms of their influences on performance. Both closure and density are decided by whether a 
focal actor’s partners form ties with each other. Closure refers to a structure where two specific 
partners of a focal actor form a tie with each other (i.e., each of the three actors linked with the 
other two actors), while density means the degree to which all the partners of a focal actor form 
ties with one another irrespective of the focal actor. These attributes enhance social capital 
(Coleman, 1988), knowledge transfer (Reagans & McEvily, 2003), and innovative performance 
(Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010) through their higher levels of trust and cooperation. 
Meanwhile, they can decrease managerial performance (Rodan & Galunic, 2004) and innovative 
performance (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007), as the focal actor can 
be more constrained by established (and often obsolete) norms. Likewise, brokerage has been 
shown to make conflicting effects on performance. It enhances performance by providing access 
to novel ideas and information (Burt, 1992; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). In contrast, brokerage can 
reduce performance because it can lead to less trust and less shared norms of behavior (Ahuja, 
10 
 
2000). To explain this inconsistency, Burt (2001) suggested that a low level of brokerage within 
a group combined with a high level of brokerage beyond the group maximizes the group’s 
performance. 
Taken together, it has not been uncommon to see that a given structural position 
positively affects the actor’s performance with regard to one network attribute of the position, 
while the same position negatively affects performance with regard to another network attribute. 
For example, a position with high centrality may increase performance, while the same position 
decreases performance via its low level of brokerage. Recently, researchers have started to look 
into a network position as a whole, instead of decomposing it into individual network attributes 
(Burt, 2010; Greve et al., 2013). Emphasizing the need to consider a network position as a 
whole, I address CSA which is the overall competitive advantage associated with a particular 
structural position in the network (Greve et al., 2013). More specifically, I investigate CSA level 
of a syndicate and its effect on performance. Additionally, I look into two moderating factors on 
this relationship. These effects on performance are investigated in the context of VC syndication. 
 
 
 
2. Venture Capital Syndication 
 
VC complements start-up companies (i.e., venture companies). From 1980 to 2005, VC 
supported approximately 30,000 U.S. venture companies (Tian, 2012). VC facilitates their 
growth by providing financial resources and non-financial supports. In particular, researchers 
have investigated the role of VC as providing financial resources to a venture company 
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(Gompers & Lerner, 2004), signaling a venture company’s quality to potential investors (Stuart 
et al., 1999), sharing collective knowledge with a venture company (Ferrary & Granovetter, 
2009), and embedding a venture company in pre-established entrepreneurial networks including 
accounting firms, law firms, and next-stage investors (Hsu, 2006). Although providing financial 
resources can be the most typical support to a venture company, the other non-financial 
contributions are also essential. This study emphasizes these non-financial contributions VC 
makes to a venture company (i.e., signaling, knowledge sharing, and embedding) as the factors 
affecting the venture company’s performance and subsequently, the VC’s performance.  
As a pattern of investment, a number of VCFs often form a syndicate with other VCFs. 
They make a collective contribution to a venture company as they make a joint investment. An 
illustration of a VC syndicate is shown in the Figure 2. This can be considered as the dominant 
investment pattern among VCFs. From 1980 to 2005, 70% of VC investments in U.S. companies 
were conducted via syndicates (Tian, 2012). Research on VC syndication can be categorized into 
three sets of studies: motivation, process, and performance. First, the motivations of VC 
syndication have been suggested as overcoming the financial constraint of an individual VCF 
(Steiner & Greenwood, 1995), sharing the investment risks (Lockett & Wright, 2001), receiving 
a confirmation of the investment decision (Lerner, 1994), and obtaining benefits such as 
subsequent investment opportunities and a status increase from the affiliation with prestigious 
partners, which can be desired by both a VCF and a venture company (Lerner, 1994). 
Additionally, VCFs form a syndicate to exercise initiatives against a venture company (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2003) and to learn other VCFs’ knowledge and to access their resources and 
capabilities (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002).  
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Second, VC syndication researchers have looked into the syndication process. Some of 
them investigated what types of VCFs are chosen as syndicate members, emphasizing the 
process of member selection. The studies showed that a lead VCF try to choose 1) reputable 
VCFs (Lerner, 1994), 2) VCFs possessing higher status within the syndication network (Dimov 
 
 
Figure 2. Venture Capital Syndicates and their Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
& Milanov, 2010), 3) VCFs that are complementary in terms of expertise (Lockett & Wright, 
2001; Meuleman, Lockett, Manigart, & Wright, 2010), and 4) VCFs that had previous 
relationships which provide higher levels of trust (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008), as its syndicate 
partners. Other researchers focused on the distinct roles of a lead VCF and non-lead VCFs in 
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their investment processes. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) described a higher level of contribution 
that a lead VCF makes to its syndicate as compared to non-lead VCFs. Also, a lead VCF was 
suggested as the most important member in terms of its influences on syndicate performance 
(Wright & Lockett, 2003; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008).  
Finally, the performance outcome of syndication has been the third theme in VC 
syndication research. Most of these studies measured performance with non-financial indicators 
such as exit type of a VC syndicate and survival rate of a venture company and focused on what 
factors bring VC syndicates better outcomes. They demonstrated that 1) syndication itself 
(Brander et al., 2002; Dimov & Milanov, 2010), 2) size of syndication (Dimov & De Clercq, 
2006; Nahata, 2008), 3) higher centrality of VCFs (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu 2007), and 4) 
prior knowledge of VCFs (De Clercq & Dimov, 2008) are positively associated with better 
outcomes. This study belongs to this third stream of VC syndication research, focusing on the 
performance resulting from VC syndication. VC’s investment is typically regarded as a success 
when it exits through initial public offering (hereafter, IPO), mergers and acquisitions, or stock 
buybacks (Guler, 2007). Among these successful exits, VC tends to obtain the highest returns 
when the venture company it supports does IPO (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Thus, this study 
adopts IPO exit as performance criterion for the VC. These successful exits including IPO are 
affected by the VC’s characteristics as well as the venture company’s characteristics. Capable 
entrepreneurs and knowledge in a venture company will help the company to obtain higher 
performance and the VC which supports the company will be more likely to exit successfully. At 
the same time, resources, knowledge, and technologies in the VCF will play a similar role as do 
those in the venture company the VC supports.  
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This study focuses on VC’s characteristics and their effect on its successful exit. More 
specifically, this study examines how performance (i.e., IPO success) of the venture company 
which a VC syndicate supports is influenced by the syndicate (i.e., CSA level) and how this 
relationship is moderated by two contingency factors (i.e., CSA diversity within the syndicate 
and the lead VCF’s reputation). First of all, CSA tends to increase the focal actor’s performance 
(Burt, 2010; Greve et al., 2013). This relationship is also applicable to VC syndication. VCFs 
with high levels of CSA have various benefits in terms of information, cooperation, and power, 
as firms with high levels of CSA obtain those benefits within their alliance network (Greve et al., 
2013). These VCFs can receive superior information which flows within the network and tends 
to be brought to the actors holding advantageous positions (Burt, 1992; Powell et al, 1996). They 
can have better cooperation with their partners, which can be enabled through shared norms and 
trust (Coleman, 1988). Furthermore, they are able to possess higher levels of power their 
advantageous positions bring. For example, the power may include bargaining power against 
partners (Bonacich, 1987), reputation among competitors (Mehra, Dixon, Brass, & Robertson, 
2006), and prestige from a high level of social status (Podolny, 1993). All these benefits help the 
VCFs contribute to the venture company supported by their syndicate more effectively, through 
signaling the quality, sharing knowledge, and embedding it in entrepreneurial networks. Then, 
the venture company will be more likely to obtain higher performance and subsequently, IPO 
success. It leads to higher performance of the syndicate. Therefore, I propose the following. 
 
Hypothesis 1. A syndicate’s CSA level is positively associated with its performance.  
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3. Diversity and Performance 
 
The performance consequences of diversity has been a key theme in the management 
field (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). The findings, however, have shown conflicting results. For 
example, at the individual level, age diversity (Kilduff, Angelmar, & Mehra, 2000), ethnic 
diversity (Richard, 2000), nationality diversity (Elron, 1997), and functional diversity (Barsade, 
Ward, Turner, & Sonnenfeld, 2000; Carpenter, 2002) have been found to positively affect 
performance. By contrast, a negative relationship was found between gender (Jehn & Bezrukova, 
2004), age (Timmerman, 2000), and ethnic (Townsend & Scott, 2001) diversity and team 
performance. Consequently, researchers have suggested several contingency factors. Williams 
and O’reilly (1998) emphasized the role of task characteristics. According to them, with regard 
to simple and routine tasks, diversity is negatively related to performance. However, complex, 
creative, and innovative tasks allow diversity to enhance performance. West (2002) showed the 
moderating effects of several favorable conditions, such as shared team objectives, feelings of 
safety, and effective conflict management on the relationship between team diversity and 
performance. Additionally, temporal factors were suggested as a moderator of this relationship 
(Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Carpenter, 2002). In a broader context related to individual 
diversity, Putnam (2007) demonstrated that ethnic diversity tends to reduce social solidarity and 
social capital in the short run, while it brings cultural, economic, fiscal, and developmental 
benefits to the community in the long run. 
At the organizational level, researchers have investigated diversity among organizations 
and its consequences. However, in line with the results at the individual level, researchers have 
found mixed results at this level. On one hand, keeping relationships with diverse partners 
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enhances performance through a wider range of learning (Powell et al., 1996; Beckman & 
Haunschild, 2002). On the other hand, maintaining ties with diverse partners can bring lower 
performance to the focal organization because of higher coordination costs (Goerzen & Beamish, 
2005). Likewise, greater diversity of alliance partners can be associated with a lower level of 
trust (Gulati, 1995). Furthermore, organizational diversity may affect performance in both 
directions (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000; Koka & Prescott, 2002).  
 
 
 
4. CSA Level and CSA Diversity 
 
Diversity of members’ network attributes has been relatively underexplored in spite of its 
influences on their team. A few exceptions include a study showing that higher creative 
performance of a team is obtained by a balance between core position members and periphery 
position members in the Hollywood film industry (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008). As a key 
determinant of performance, Cattani and Ferriani (2008) suggested distinct effects of core and 
periphery. Member in peripheral positions are more willing to receive novel ideas from outside 
as they have an intention to increase their status (Burt, 1980), while members in core positions 
provide legitimacy that supports novel ideas (Cross & Cummings, 2004). So, both the roles of 
introducing novel ideas and supporting them can be essential to a team. In their study of the 
Hollywood film industry, Cattani and Ferriani (2008) demonstrated that a team of either only 
core members or only peripheral members tends to obtain lower creative performance than a 
balanced team. A study by Aven and Hillmann (2014) demonstrated that higher performance is 
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obtained by a founding team with structural complementarity, which is composed of both 
entrepreneurs who play a brokerage role and entrepreneurs who have access to cohesive clusters 
(i.e., a diverse team in terms of network structure). Although these studies have shown a positive 
effect of diversity on performance in terms of members’ network attributes, it may affect 
performance negatively in certain conditions. For example, it can decrease performance through 
the interaction with another factor regardless of its simple effect on performance. This study 
looks into the interaction effect between CSA level and CSA diversity by examining both the 
condition where CSA level is low and the condition where CSA level is high. 
In the condition where CSA level of a syndicate is low, CSA diversity’s contribution to 
performance increases, when compared to the other condition (i.e., the condition where CSA 
level of a syndicate is high). First, coordination costs from CSA diversity become reduced. When 
CSA level of a syndicate is low, the majority of the syndicate members hold low levels of CSA. 
They tend to possess lower levels of resources and capabilities (hereafter, R&Cs). In most cases, 
they prefer prestigious partners that tend to have high levels of CSA as they expect benefits from 
high levels of R&Cs these partners possess. But, forming links with prestigious partners is not 
easy as every actor seeks a better partner than itself. So, when they have a chance, they are more 
willing to cooperate even under a disadvantageous contract (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010). 
Furthermore, the majority are more willing to cooperate with partners with high levels of CSA 
because they will not only consider the current syndicate performance but also look forward to a 
future syndication with these partners. They show this tendency because they intend to increase 
their status through affiliating with prestigious partners. Thus, within the syndicate, they will be 
more collaborative and there will be less conflict. As a result, coordination costs from CSA 
diversity decrease as the majority of the syndicate members are more cooperative. Second, 
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benefits from CSA diversity become enhanced in the condition where CSA level of a syndicate 
is low. In this condition, the majority of the members have low levels of CSA. They are more 
willing to accept novel and different ideas, as they have an intention to enhance their current 
position (Becker, 1970; Burt, 1980), than members with high levels of CSA. So, the dominant 
atmosphere of the syndicate becomes to encourage difference and diversity. The syndicate can 
adopt novel ideas and opinions from diverse members more effectively. Taken together, the costs 
decreases and the benefits increases. Therefore, the contribution of CSA diversity to performance 
becomes higher than in the condition where CSA level is high. 
In contrary, when CSA level of a syndicate is high, the contribution of CSA diversity to 
performance decreases, compared to the former condition (i.e., the condition where CSA level of 
a syndicate is low). First, benefits from CSA diversity become reduced in this condition. When 
CSA level of a syndicate is high, the majority of the syndicate members have high levels of 
CSA. They tend to possess higher levels of R&Cs and they are less willing to accept novel and 
different ideas for fear of losing their current high status. In other words, they show risk-averse 
behaviors. Many studies have shown that the incumbents that already possess secure positions do 
not adopt contra-normative or competence-destroying innovation (Tushman & Anderson 1986; 
Bower & Christensen 1995). Although they may obtain higher performance in the short term, 
they are likely to have a difficulty in the long term. These studies indicate that members with 
high levels of CSA in a syndicate can be reluctant to adopt novel ideas and opinions coming 
from diverse partners. The dominant atmosphere of the syndicate becomes to maintain the 
current norms and traditions. So, they do not take advantage of the contribution from diverse 
others and the benefits from CSA diversity decreases. Second, costs from partners with low 
levels of CSA still incur in this condition, although this syndicate is less likely to obtain the 
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benefits diverse partners can bring to the syndicate. More specifically, diversity in terms of CSA 
can increase the coordination costs because diversity leads to information discontinuities, lack of 
trust and familiarity, and the need to gather and assimilate a wide range of information (Goerzen 
& Beamish, 2005). In other words, in this condition, diversity’s costs are not mitigated, while its 
benefits are reduced. Therefore, when CSA of a syndicate is high, the contribution of CSA 
diversity to performance becomes lower than in the case where the CSA is low. In line with this 
logic, I propose the following. 
 
Hypothesis 2. CSA diversity within a syndicate weakens the positive relationship 
between the syndicate’s CSA level and its performance. 
 
 
 
5. CSA Level and Lead Venture Capital Firm’s Reputation 
 
This study follows the definition of reputation by Fombrun (1996, p.72), “A perceptual 
representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall 
appeal to all its key constituents when compared to other leading rivals.” Reputation tends to 
bring the focal actor benefits such as signals of their higher abilities to others (Spence, 1973), 
access to valuable resources and information (Gompers, 1996), and price premium (Podolny, 
1993; Hsu, 2004). Reputation also prevents the focal firm from engaging in opportunistic 
behaviors through the fear of reputational damage (Wright & Lockett, 2003). Likewise, 
reputation has been suggested as a positive factor in the VC industry. As a prominent (i.e., 
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reputable) VCF signals the quality of the venture company it supports, the company obtains 
higher performance with regard to IPO (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Nahata, 2008). 
Also, a reputable VCF’s investment brings higher premium to its venture company in M&A 
(Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012). However, the lead VCF’s reputation has not received the attention it 
deserves, although reputation has been widely addressed in the VC industry.  
A lead VCF plays an important role in the syndicate and critically affects the syndicate 
performance. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) showed that a lead VCF devotes three to five times 
more time to managing the investment, as compared to non-lead VCFs. A lead VCF also takes 
the largest stake, receives more informal information, and wields dominant power in decision 
making processes (Wright & Lockett, 2003). Sorenson and Stuart (2008) focused on the distance 
between a lead VCF and potential VC partners in terms of geography and industry experience. 
They found that distant ties between them are more likely to be formed when specific investment 
conditions are met (i.e., the venture company’s industry, home region, age, syndicate size, and 
ties among syndicate members). All these studies indicate the critical role of a lead VCF in the 
VC syndicate’s performance. Among the characteristics of a lead VCF, I suggest that its 
reputation can be a critical determinant of its syndicate’s performance. A lead VCF’s reputation 
can enhance its syndicate’s performance in itself. First, potential investors are aware that a 
reputable lead VCF will behave less opportunistically because its reputational damage is more 
significant in close knit communities such as the VC industry (Meuleman et al., 2010). Thus, 
potential investors will consider the venture company supported by a reputable lead VCF’s 
syndicate as a less risky investment target in terms of opportunistic behaviors. Second, a 
reputable VCF maintains a higher standard in choosing their partners. Because reciprocity 
between partners is critical, a reputable firm tries to select a firm that is both capable and reliable 
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(Stuart et al., 1999). The partners of a reputable lead VCF include both non-lead VCFs and the 
venture company. This tendency will increase the possibility of the venture company’s success. 
Moreover, potential investors regard the VC syndicate led by a reputable VCF as a capable and 
reliable syndicate and the venture company backed by the reputable lead VCF as a promising 
target.  
All these positive influences of a reputable lead VCF can increase if its syndicate’s CSA 
level is high. In other words, a lead VCF’s reputation can be another contingency factor 
impacting the relationship between its syndicate’s CSA and performance. When a syndicate’s 
CSA level is high, the lead VCF’s reputation can bring higher performance. As audiences 
consider two consecutive positive signals as a confirmation of the focal actor’s quality (Zhao & 
Zhou, 2011), the combination between a syndicate’s high level of CSA and the lead VCF’s 
reputation can work as a confirmation of the venture company’s quality to potential investors. 
Then, they will have more confidence in the value of the venture company and the company is 
more likely to do an IPO than otherwise. Furthermore, coordination of non-lead VCFs can be 
affected by their lead VCF’s reputation. When a syndicate’s CSA level is high, coordination of 
the members will not be easy to a lead VCF with low reputation as they tend to have higher 
levels of criteria about their leader. Instead, if this syndicate is led by a reputable VCF, the 
reputation can provide legitimacy to the lead VCF as a signal of its capabilities and experience 
(Spence, 1973). In other words, the non-lead VCFs will acknowledge the lead VCF’s capabilities 
and decision making of the syndicate will be made with lower coordination costs. Also, a 
reputable lead VCF is likely to have more experience and resources through previous 
experiences. Then, the lead VCF will be able to coordinate its non-lead VCFs with high levels of 
CSA more effectively. On the contrary, if a syndicate’s CSA level is low, a less-reputable leader 
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will have fewer difficulties in coordinating its non-lead VCFs than a similar leader coordinating 
powerful partners. Thus, the contribution of a lead VCF’s reputation to performance becomes 
lower in this condition than the condition where a syndicate’s CSA is high. In line with this 
logic, I propose the following.   
 
Hypothesis 3. A lead venture capital firm’s reputation strengthens the positive 
relationship between its syndicate’s CSA level and the syndicate’s performance.  
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
1. Sample and Data 
 
I analyzed all VC syndicate investments from 1990 to 2000 and their exit performance 
from 1990 to 2010. I adopted this timeframe because the 10-year period after the last investment 
round should be considered when evaluating the success of a venture company (Guler, 2007). I 
collected data from the VentureXpert database of SDC Thomson, which has been extensively 
used to investigate the VC industry (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). The dataset provided 6,173 VC 
syndicate investments made by 16,119 VCFs in the period from 1990 to 2000 (i.e., the 
investments of which both the first and the last investment rounds belong to the period from 
1990 to 2000). With regard to the patent information of venture companies, I used the dataset 
provided by National Bureau of Economic Research’s Patent Data Project. In terms of lead 
VCFs’ reputation, I referred to the Lee, Pollock, & Jin’s VC Reputation Index (Lee, Pollock, & 
Jin, 2011). After removing missing observations, the final sample consisted of 1,137 VC 
syndicate investments by 6,268 VCFs. Among 1,137 VC syndicate investments, 17.5% (i.e., 199 
venture companies) held an IPO. These syndicates invested in venture companies from 26 
countries. The nationalities of the venture companies are shown in Appendix 1. IPO successes 
according to their nationalities are presented in Appendix 2. The industries of venture companies 
and IPO success rates according to their industries are indicated in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4. 
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Additionally, I presented IPO success rates according to the number of VCFs within a syndicate, 
the number of corporate VCFs within a syndicate, and the number of financial affiliates within a 
syndicate in Appendices 5 to 7. 
 
 
 
2. Dependent Variable: Exit Performance 
 
The dependent variable was included in the models as a dummy variable indicating 
successful exit of a syndicate. The successful exit was measured as whether the venture company 
the syndicate supported succeeded in an IPO or not (i.e., IPO success). Although this variable 
represents a venture company’s performance, it is directly linked to the VC syndicate’s 
performance that results from supporting the venture company. If a venture company supported 
by a VC syndicate succeeded in doing an IPO from 1990 to 2010, I assigned one to the 
dependent variable as a successful exit of the VC syndicate. Otherwise, zero was assigned. 
 
 
 
3. Independent Variables 
 
This study investigated the effects of three independent variables measured at the 
syndicate level: CSA level of the syndicate, CSA diversity within the syndicate, and the lead 
VCF’s reputation. CSA of a VCF was measured from network ties formed by the VCF with 
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other VCFs within the VC industry. I assumed that a tie was formed between two VCFs if they 
belonged to the same VC syndicate at least once (Hochberg et al., 2007). Also, I adopted an 
assumption that network ties last for five years (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Through these steps, 
annual network matrices were created for each year from 1990 to 2000. The number of VCFs in 
annual networks ranged from 2,117 to 6,366. On the basis of these network ties formed by VCFs, 
I calculated network characteristics of each VCF in each year. I matched each VCF’s network 
characteristics to the values in the year of its last investment round. After removing missing 
values, I obtained 16,119 observations of VCFs’ network characteristics, using UCINET 6 
(Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002). Then, I conducted a principal factor analysis with three 
network characteristics of these observations (i.e., number of ties, brokerage level, and power 
centrality), as they represent three components of CSA: cooperation, information, and power 
(Greve et al., 2013). The number of ties is associated with more cooperation, while brokerage 
level is related to quality of information. Higher power centrality of a focal actor within a 
network means higher level of power the actor can wield. The number of ties was measured by 
the number of direct ties a focal VCF formed (Freeman, 1979). Brokerage level was measured by 
the inverse value of network constraint (Burt, 1992). As in previous research about VCFs 
(Podolny, 1993; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), power centrality was measured by using Bonacich’s 
measurement (1987). This measure is formally defined as follows: 
 
𝑐 (𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝛼 ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝑘+1 1,
∞
𝑘=0
 
 
where α is a scaling factor, β is a weighting factor, R is a matrix of relationships, and 1 is a 
column vector of 1’s. I set all main diagonal elements to 0, each element rij and rji in the matrix R 
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to 1 if a tie is formed, and 0 otherwise. According to this measure, a focal firm’s status is a 
positive function of the number of ties and the status of other firms the focal firm forms ties with. 
Also, I followed the example of previous research for the designation of β in this measure and set it equal 
to three-quarters of the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue (Podolny, 1993; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). 
The new factor explained 93.5% of the variation of three network characteristics and I 
operationalized this factor as CSA level. I checked this factor’s validity over time by conducting 
factor analyses every year from 1990 to 2000. As the analyses brought constant results that 
explained more than 90% of the variation every year, the factor’s validity was confirmed. These 
results are presented in Appendix 6. CSA level of a syndicate was calculated as the sum of VCFs’ 
CSA levels and included in the model as the first predictor.1 CSA diversity within a syndicate 
was included in the analyses as the first moderating variable. Both the diversity and its 
interaction term with CSA level were included in the model to investigate its moderating effect. 
Diversity value was measured as coefficient of variation (i.e., the ratio of the standard deviation 
to the mean, Harrison, Price & Bell, 1988), as CSA was expressed as numeric values instead of 
categorical values which is common in diversity research.2 Finally, the lead VCF’s reputation as 
the second moderating variable and its interaction term with CSA level were included in the 
                                                 
1 As an alternative to the initial measure of a syndicate’s CSA level (i.e., the sum of VCFs’ CSA levels), I also tested 
the model with the average value of VCFs’ CSA levels. I found no significant changes from the initial result. 
However, the sum of VCFs’ CSA levels represents the syndicate’s CSA level more appropriately than average of 
VCFs’ CSA levels. For example, a syndicate of ten VCFs with CSA level 0.5 will possess higher level of CSA than 
a syndicate of two VCFs with CSA level 0.5. Also, the number of VCFs within a syndicate is already included in the 
model as a control. Therefore, I adopted the sum of VCFs’ CSA levels as the measure of a syndicate’s CSA level. 
 
2 Diversity can be variously measured, such as Blau’s heterogeneity index (Blau, 1977), Shannon’s measure of 
entropy (Shannon, 1949), coefficient of variation (Harrison, Price & Bell, 1988), and so on. However, because the 
observations used in this study have numeric value instead of categorical value, the coefficient of variation can 
measure diversity value much more appropriately than other measures. For example, both Blau’s heterogeneity 
index and Shannon’s measure of entropy regard these different two syndicates (i.e., a syndicate A of member 1 with 
CSA level 0.1 & member 2 with CSA level 0.9 and a syndicate B of member 3 with CSA level 0.4 & member 4 with 
CSA level 0.5) as the same.  
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model. I applied three criteria to identify a lead VCF.3 Following Sorenson and Stuart (2008), I 
considered the first round investor as the lead VCF. If multiple VCFs invested in the first round, 
I adopted the one that invested in all the rounds. If more than one VCF still remained as 
candidates, I regarded the VCF that invested the largest amount of money as the lead investor 
(Lee & Wahal, 2004). Reputation value was assigned to each lead VCF on the basis of the Lee, 
Pollock, & Jin’s VC Reputation Index (Lee, Pollock, & Jin, 2011). This index was annually 
calculated from 1990 to 2010 on the basis of six factors: average of the number of investment 
funds under management in the prior five years, number of venture companies invested in over 
the prior five years, total dollar amount of funds invested in start-ups over the prior five years, 
number of companies taken public (i.e., IPO success) in the prior five years, and VCF’s age. 
 
 
 
4. Control Variables 
 
In this study, I controlled for a number of variables. First, characteristics of investment 
are associated with a venture company’s performance. I controlled for the amount of money 
invested in the venture company by a VC syndicate, which increases the syndicate’s exit success 
likelihood (Guler, 2007; Waguespack & Fleming, 2009). Also, temporal aspects affect 
performance. As length of investment is related to more non-financial support, this can increase 
the venture company’s performance. Thus, I controlled for the months from the first investment 
                                                 
3 I checked another option for identifying the lead firm of a VC syndicate. I applied only the first two criteria (i.e. 1) 
the first investor and 2) the investor that participated in all the rounds, if more than two investors in the first round) 
and conducted the analyses. Though the number of observations was lower than the initial observation number (i.e., 
n=642), the analyses brought similar results.  
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round to the last one. The number of investment rounds can increase a venture company’s 
performance, as more rounds mean continual financial support (Tian, 2011). So, I controlled for 
the number of the investment rounds a VC syndicate made.  
 Second, syndicate members may affect the likelihood of the syndicate’s exit success. For 
example, the number of syndicate members may affect the venture company’s performance. As 
all VCFs of a syndicate potentially contribute both financial and non-financial resources to the 
venture company the syndicate supports (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008), more VCFs can increase the 
venture company’s performance (Guler, 2007; Hallen, 2008). Also, more VCFs may incur less 
risk to their syndicate (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Although the reduced risk may not be directly 
related to the venture company’s success, it can affect the VCFs’ supports to the company. Thus, 
I controlled for the number of participating VCFs in a syndicate. Moreover, the types of 
syndicate members may affect the venture company’s IPO success. In particular, corporate VC 
(Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010) and syndicate members affiliated with a financial institution 
(Higgins & Gulati, 2006) can affect the venture company’s performance. Thus, I controlled for 
the number of corporate VCF and the number of syndicate members affiliated with financial 
institutions within a VC syndicate. Additionally, as previous investment experiences can be 
helpful to VCFs (Sørensen, 2007), I controlled for the average number of investment rounds in 
which VCFs participated.   
Third, as a leader affects the group to which he/she belongs, a lead VCF can affect its 
syndicate’s performance (i.e., the venture company’s IPO success likelihood). I controlled for the 
lead VCF’s centrality, as a VCF’s network centrality enhances its investment performance 
(Hochberg et al., 2007). I referred to previous research which adopted Bonacich’s measure to 
operationalize the centrality (Podolny, 1993; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Moreover, I controlled 
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for foreignness of a lead VCF to a venture company. If the lead VCF and a venture company are 
from the same nation, they may have less difficulty in their cooperation, particularly with regard 
to laws, institutions, and languages. If the nationalities of these two organizations are different, I 
assigned one. Contrarily, if these two organizations are from the same country, I assigned zero.  
Fourth, I controlled for a venture company’s characteristics. First of all, I included a 
dummy variable of whether a venture company possessed any patent during the focal period in 
the analyses. This represents a venture company’s quality in terms of knowledge and technology. 
Furthermore, this can be considered as a proxy of the venture company’s overall capability. If a 
company possesses a patent, potential investors tend to regard it as a signal of capability. Then, 
the venture company’s IPO success likelihood may increase. In addition, I included a venture 
company’s nationality in the analyses. In particular, this variable was included in the two stage 
least squares models as the instrument. I categorized 56 nationalities of the venture companies 
into six groups: the U.S., Canada, the U.K., other European countries, South Korea, and other 
countries. This categorization was conducted on the basis of the number of investments each 
group had in the 6,713 VC investments during the focal period. Also, I controlled for effects of 
the industry to which a venture company belongs, as the industry can affect the venture 
company’s IPO success (Guler, 2007). I categorized 17 industry clusters into five groups: 
bio/medical industry group, software industry group, internet specific industry group, 
communication industry group, and the group of other industries. Similar to the variable of a 
venture company’s nationality, this categorization was based on the investment number of each 
group among the 6,713 VC investments during the focal period. I controlled for industry effects 
by including four dummy variables representing the first four industry groups each. Additionally, 
I considered any potential location effect by including a dummy variable indicating whether a 
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venture company is located in California. A venture company in this specific area is able to 
obtain the best location advantages in the world and its IPO success likelihood may increase 
(Dimov & Milanov, 2010). Thus, I controlled for investment in California by assigning one to 
VC syndicates which invested in a venture company located in California. I assigned zero to the 
other VC syndicates. 
Finally, I controlled for general conditions during the focal period by including period 
variables in the models. Ritter and Welch (2002) categorized the focal period from 1990 to 2000 
into three spans in terms of IPO success rate (i.e., 1990~1994, 1995~1998, and 1999~2000). I 
assigned each VC syndicate to one of these three spans on the basis of the year to which the 
syndicate’s last investment round belongs and included the dummy variables transformed from 
these categorical values. In my dataset, 46.0% of the IPOs were made in the year of the last 
investment round, and 32.8% of the IPOs in the next year. Table 1 explains how each variable is 
operationalized. 
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Table 1. Variables, Definitions, and Operationalizations 
 
Variable Definition Operationalization Sources 
  1. IPO of the Venture Company 
Success of the venture company in terms 
of IPO from 1990 to 2010 
Dummy variable (Success: 1 and Failure: 0) 
SDC Thomson, Global 
New Issues Database 
 
2. CSA Level 
 
 
Competitive advantage from holding a 
network position 
 
Factor obtained by a factor analysis with 
three network attributes (degree, centrality, 
and brokerage) in the year of the last 
investment round 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
 
  3. CSA Diversity 
Diversity within the VC syndicate in terms 
of CSA level 
Coefficient of variation (i.e., standard 
deviation over mean) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
  4. Lead VCF Reputation Reputation of the lead VCF 
Reputation value of the lead VCF in the year 
of the last investment round (The Lee, 
Pollock, & Jin’s index value) 
Lee, Pollock, & Jin’s 
VC Reputation Index 
   
5. Invested Money 
 
Total amount of money invested in the 
venture company 
 
Invested money (USD) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
  6. Length of Investment  Length of the investment period 
Months from the first investment round to the 
last investment round 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
  7. # of Investment Rounds Number of the investment round Number of the investment round  
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
  8. # of Participating VCFs 
Number of the VCFs within a VC 
syndicate 
Number of the VCFs within the VC syndicate 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
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Table 1. Variables, Definitions, and Operationalizations (cont.) 
 
 
Variable Definition Operationalization Sources 
  9. # of Corporate VCFs  
Number of the corporate VCFs within the 
VC syndicate 
Number of the corporate VCFs within the VC 
syndicate 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
10. # of Financial Affiliates 
Number of the VC syndicate members 
affiliated with a financial institution  
Number of the VC syndicate members 
affiliated with a financial institution 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
11. Experience of VCFs  
Experience of the VCFs within the VC 
syndicate 
Average of the previous investment rounds 
conducted by the VC syndicate’s members 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
12. Lead VCF’s Centrality Centrality of the lead VCF Bonacich's power centrality 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
13. Lead VCF’s Foreignness  
Difference between the venture company's 
nationality and the lead VCF's nationality 
Dummy variable (Different nationalities: 1 and 
the same nationality: 0) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
14. Patent Dummy  
Possession of any patents by the venture 
company 
Dummy variable (Any patent until the last 
investment round: 1 and no patent: 0) 
National Bureau of 
Economic Research 
patent data project 
15. Company's Nationality Nationality of the venture company 
Assignment of numeric value according to the 
category (US: 6, Canada:5, UK:4, Other 
European countries: 3, South Korea:2, Etc.: 1) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
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Table 1. Variables, Definitions, and Operationalizations (cont.) 
 
 
Variable Definition Operationalization Sources 
16. Industry Dummy (Bio/medical 
industry group) 
The venture company’s inclusion in the 
bio/medical industry group 
Dummy variable (Bio/medical industry group: 
1 and otherwise: 0) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
17. Industry Dummy (Software 
industry group) 
The venture company’s inclusion in the 
software industry group 
Dummy variable (Software industry: 1 and 
otherwise: 0) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
18. Industry Dummy (Internet 
specific industry group)  
The venture company’s inclusion in the 
internet specific industry group 
Dummy variable (Internet specific industry 
group: 1 and otherwise: 0) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
19. Industry Dummy 
(Communication industry group) 
The venture company’s inclusion in the 
communication industry group 
Dummy variable (Communication group: 1 and 
otherwise: 0) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
20. Investment in California 
The venture company's location 
(California versus other places) 
Dummy variable (California: 1 and other 
places: 0) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
21. Period Dummy (1995-1998) The period when the investment was made 
Dummy variable (The last investment round 
belonging to the period from 1995 to 1998: 1 
and otherwise: 0) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
22. Period Dummy (1999-2000) The period when the investment was made 
Dummy variable (The last investment round 
belonging to the period from 1999 to 2000: 1 
and otherwise: 0) 
SDC Thomson, 
VentureXpert 
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IV. ANALSYSES AND RESULTS 
 
1. Statistical Analyses 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of all the variables 
in this study. This table was created from the variables’ raw values. Before conducting analyses, 
I checked each variable’s distribution. Among a variable’s various forms such as inverse, square, 
log, and cubic, I adopted the form which is most similar to the normal distribution for each 
variable. With regard to most variables, the raw values were closer to the normal distribution 
than any other forms. However, in terms of three variables (i.e., invested money, experience of 
VCFs, and lead VCF centrality), their log forms showed a closer distribution to the normal one 
than others. So, I transformed the raw values of these three variables into log values. Then, I 
standardized all the variables including three log-transformed variables and included them in the 
models. To assess the potential threat of collinearity, I estimated the variance inflation factors 
(i.e., VIFs) of the standardized values. I found that the greatest VIF of a variable was 4.15, which 
is much lower than the commonly used criterion (i.e., 10; Aiken & West, 1991). The average 
VIF of the variables was 2.09. 
To predict the dichotomous dependent variable (i.e., IPO success of a venture company 
backed by a VC syndicate), I conducted probit analysis, which estimates the probability that an 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations a  
 
              
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. IPO success 0.18 0.38            
2. CSA Level 0.53 2.20 -0.05           
3. CSA Diversity 0.90 34.27 0.00 0.03          
4. Lead VCF Reputation 24.99 22.47 0.02 0.38 0.07         
5. Invested Money 24614.59 30602.74 0.14 0.22 0.03 0.14        
6. Length of Investment 21.69 20.35 0.21 -0.24 -0.04 0.02 0.17       
7. # of Investment Rounds 3.13 1.76 0.16 -0.14 -0.02 0.07 0.35 0.72      
8. # of Participating VCFs 5.54 3.47 0.24 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.61 0.34 0.50     
9. # of Corporate VCFs 0.66 1.11 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.39 0.09 0.19 0.55    
10. # of  Financial Affiliates 0.39 0.77 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.07 0.42 0.17 0.26 0.56 0.22   
11. Experience of VCFs 3338.73 3110.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12  
12. Lead VCF’s Centrality 1740.12 1903.69 0.00 0.45 0.06 0.90 0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.06 
13. Lead VCF’s Foreignness 0.09 0.29 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.05 0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 
14. Patent 0.08 0.28 0.64 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.06 
15. Company's Nationality 5.62 1.19 -0.08 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.01 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.16 
16. Bio/ Medical Industry 0.13 0.34 0.08 -0.09 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.21 0.13 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 0.03 
17. Software Industry 0.25 0.43 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.04 
18. Internet Industry 0.30 0.46 -0.06 0.12 0.02 -0.05 0.16 -0.26 -0.14 0.08 0.14 0.07 -0.05 
19. Communication Industry 0.13 0.34 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.09 0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.01 
20. Investment in California 0.44 0.50 -0.02 0.12 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.04 
21. Period (1995-1998) 0.27 0.44 0.10 -0.15 -0.02 0.09 -0.18 0.06 0.08 -0.09 -0.15 -0.08 0.01 
22. Period (1999-2000) 0.65 0.48 -0.11 0.15 0.02 -0.14 0.26 -0.02 -0.06 0.13 0.21 0.12 -0.06 
              
a n=1,137. Correlations above |.06| are significant at the .05 level.           
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations a (cont.) 
 
            
Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1. IPO success           
2. CSA Level           
3. CSA Diversity           
4. Lead VCF Reputation           
5. Invested Money           
6. Length of Investment            
7. # of Investment Rounds           
8. # of Participating VCFs           
9. # of Corporate VCFs            
10. # of  Financial Affiliates           
11. Experience of VCFs            
12. Lead VCF’s Centrality           
13. Lead VCF’s Foreignness  -0.05           
14. Patent  0.03  -0.02          
15. Company's Nationality 0.07  -0.63  0.03         
16. Bio/ Medical Industry 0.02  -0.02  0.07  0.04        
17. Software Industry 0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.04  -0.22       
18. Internet Industry -0.02  0.01  -0.08  0.01  -0.25  -0.37      
19. Communication Industry 0.08  -0.03  0.05  -0.03  -0.15  -0.22  -0.25     
20. Investment in California 0.16  -0.21  0.02  0.29  -0.05  -0.02  0.06  -0.01    
21. Period (1995-1998) 0.04  -0.08  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.07  -0.23  0.09  0.01   
22. Period (1999-2000) -0.08  0.09  -0.07  -0.11  -0.13  -0.10  0.32  -0.06  -0.06  -0.83  
           
a n=1,137. Correlations above |.06| are significant at the .05 level.        
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observation with specific characteristics will fall into one of two categories. However, there 
might be an endogeneity problem in the model, because the independent variables (i.e., CSA 
level) may be significantly correlated with the error term. Therefore, I adopted the two-stage 
least squares approach to address this problem (Wooldridge, 2002). In particular, a relationship 
may exist between a venture company’s nationality and CSA level of the syndicate that supports 
the company. In some countries, both VCFs with low levels of CSA and VCFs with high levels 
of CSA can invest in venture companies. Meanwhile, only VCFs with high levels of CSA can 
invest in venture companies in other countries because VCFs with low levels of CSA can’t 
endure risks and can’t get sufficient information. So, a venture company’s nationality affects the 
pool of potential VCFs and consequently, the VCFs’ CSA, although it does not directly decide 
the advantage. Simultaneously, the nationality does not directly affect the syndicate performance. 
Furthermore, this approach was methodologically justified as all the relevant models (i.e., Model 
2, 3, 4, and 5) brought significant endogeneity at the level of 99.9% in the Wald test of 
exogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, I included the venture company’s nationality as the 
instrument, with CSA level of the syndicate as the instrumented predictor. I conducted these 2-
stage least squares analyses by using the ivprobit command of the statistical package Stata 11.  
 
 
 
2. Results 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the analyses. First, Model 1 is the base probit model 
only with control variables. This model shows that the amount of invested money, the length of 
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Table 3. Probit Estimates of IPO Success a, b, c  
 
       
Variables Model 1 (probit) Model 2 (ivprobit) Model 3 (ivprobit) 
       
Control        
  Invested Money 0.28 (0.09)** -0.11 (0.07) -1.12 (0.07)† 
  Length of Investment  0.35 (0.08)*** 0.35 (0.07)*** 0.29 (0.07)*** 
  # of Investment Rounds -0.20 (0.09)* 0.00 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 
  # of Participating VCFs 0.20 (0.09)* 0.32 (0.06)*** 0.96 (0.09)*** 
  # of Corporate VCFs  0.05 (0.07) -0.00 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04)* 
  # of  Financial Affiliates -0.07 (0.07) -0.27 (0.05)*** -0.07 (0.05) 
  Experience of VCFs 0.07 (0.07) -0.12 (0.04)** -0.19 (0.05)*** 
  Lead VCF’s Centrality -0.11 (0.06)† -0.52 (0.04)*** -0.46 (0.04)*** 
  Lead VCF’s Foreignness  0.16 (0.24) 0.12 (0.17) 0.19 (0.16)*** 
  Patent 3.38 (0.32)*** 1.34 (0.54)* 1.31 (0.53)* 
  Company's Nationality c -0.26 (0.07)***     
  Bio/ Medical Industry 0.11 (0.20) 0.09 (0.13) 0.12 (0.13) 
  Software Industry 0.10 (0.17) 0.09 (0.11) 0.05 (0.11) 
  Internet Industry 0.22 (0.19) 0.12 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) 
  Communication Industry -0.53 (0.25)* -0.33 (0.16)* -0.47 (0.16)** 
  Investment in California -0.05 (0.13) -0.13 (0.08) -0.17 (0.08) 
  Period Dummy (1995-1998) -0.27 (0.21) -0.02 (0.15) 0.09 (0.15) 
  Period Dummy (1999-2000) -0.96 (0.23)*** -0.58 (0.19)** -0.32 (0.20) 
       
Predictor       
  CSA Level   1.15 (0.09)*** 1.55 (0.13)*** 
  CSA Diversity     0.28 (0.03) 
  CSA Level *  CSA Diversity     -1.24 (0.13)*** 
  Lead VCF Reputation       
  CSA Level *  Lead VCF Reputation       
       
n 1137 1137 1137 
LR  χ2 460.1   
Wald  χ2  1014.3 1070.21 
Log-likelihood -297.24 -1650.07 -1293.13 
              
       
a. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.      
b. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001      
c. Included as an instrumental variable in Model 2, 3, 4, & 5     
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Table 3. Probit Estimates of IPO Success a, b, c (cont.) 
 
     
Variables Model 4 (ivprobit) Model 5 (ivprobit) 
     
Control      
  Invested Money -0.09 (0.07) -0.11 (0.07)† 
  Length of Investment  0.26 (0.07)*** 0.23 (0.07)** 
  # of Investment Rounds -0.03 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07) 
  # of Participating VCFs 0.35 (0.06)*** 0.98 (0.09)*** 
  # of Corporate VCFs  -0.04 (0.05) 0.06 (0.04) 
  # of  Financial Affiliates -0.25 (0.05)*** -0.08 (0.05)† 
  Experience of VCFs -0.11 (0.04)* -0.18 (0.05)*** 
  Lead VCF’s Centrality -0.70 (0.06)*** -0.66 (0.06)*** 
  Lead VCF’s Foreignness  0.29 (0.17)† 0.36 (0.16)* 
  Patent 1.32 (0.56)* 1.37 (0.55)* 
  Company's Nationality c     
  Bio/ Medical Industry 0.04 (0.13) 0.08 (0.13)† 
  Software Industry 0.02 (0.11) -0.01 (0.11) 
  Internet Industry 0.04 (0.12) 0.00 (0.12) 
  Communication Industry -0.36 (0.16)* -0.52 (0.15)** 
  Investment in California -0.05 (0.08) -0.10 (0.08) 
  Period Dummy (1995-1998) 0.06 (0.15) 0.15 (0.15) 
  Period Dummy (1999-2000) -0.27 (0.20) -0.08 (0.21) 
     
Predictor     
  CSA Level 1.62 (0.12)*** 2.06 (0.17)*** 
  CSA Diversity   -0.01 (0.03) 
  CSA Level *  CSA Diversity   -1.17 (0.14)*** 
  Lead VCF Reputation 0.57 (0.07)*** 0.53 (0.07)*** 
  CSA Level *  Lead VCF Reputation -1.20 (0.09)*** -1.14 (0.09)*** 
     
n 1137 1137 
LR  χ2   
Wald  χ2 1023.35 1007.65 
Log-likelihood -1282.49 -981.41 
          
     
a. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.    
b. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001    
c. Included as an instrumental variable in Model 2, 3, 4, & 5   
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investment, the number of VCFs, and patent possession significantly increase IPO success rate at 
least at the .05 level. The model also presents negative effects of the investment round number, 
the venture company’s nationality, the venture company’s inclusion in the communication 
industry, and the period from 1999 to 2000 on the rate at least at the .05 level. With regard to the 
venture company’s nationality, I assigned higher value to each country on the basis of the degree 
to which the major country’s VCFs in terms of the number (i.e., 78.56% of the VCFs belonged to 
the U.S. during the focal period) can easily make investments. 4 The result means that venture 
companies located in a country where VCFs of the U.S. will have difficulties in their investment 
tend to obtain higher performance. I expect that this result comes from the excellence of the 
companies chosen by the VCFs despite the difficulties they might have in the investment. The 
analysis result of this simple probit model is presented in Appendix 9. 
As mentioned above, I adopted 2SLS approach to address the possible endogeneity 
problem from Model 2 to Model 5. Model 2 includes CSA level of a syndicate as the 
independent variable in addition to the controls in Model 1. The result provides strong support to 
the expectation. CSA level has a positively significant coefficient (i.e., 1.146) in the probit 
regression. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the level of a syndicate’s CSA increases the syndicate’s 
performance (p < .001).  
In Model 3, CSA diversity is included as a moderating factor on the relationship between 
CSA level and performance. Both CSA diversity and its interaction term with CSA level are 
added to Model 2. The result shows that CSA diversity strongly weakens the positive 
relationship between CSA level and performance. In other words, when CSA diversity is high, 
the performance increase resulting from CSA level is reduced. So, Hypothesis 2 is strongly 
                                                 
4 The value was assigned from 1 to 6 (US: 6, Canada:5, UK:4, Other European countries: 3, South Korea:2, Etc.: 1). 
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supported (p < .001). Figure 3 illustrates the interaction effects of Model 3. The figure shows the 
probit of IPO success according to standardized CSA level under two conditions (i.e., a high 
level of CSA diversity and a low level of CSA diversity). When CSA level is low, a high level of 
CSA diversity is more likely to bring IPO success than a low level of CSA diversity. But, the 
increasing likelihood of IPO success from increasing CSA level in the condition of a high level 
of CSA diversity is lower than the one in the condition of a low level of CSA diversity. After a 
threshold, this situation is changed. As CSA level becomes high, a low level of CSA diversity is 
more likely to bring IPO success than high level of CSA diversity. The increasing likelihood of  
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction Effect on the Venture Company’s IPO Success: CSA  
 Level & CSA Diversity  
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IPO success from increasing CSA level in the condition of a low level of CSA diversity is still 
higher than the one in the condition of a high level of CSA diversity. As mentioned above, CSA 
diversity is shown to weaken the positive relationship between CSA level and performance. 
Model 4 is about the second moderating variable (i.e., the lead VCF’s reputation).  Lead 
VCF’s reputation and its interaction term with CSA level are included in addition to Model 2. 
However, contrary to the expectation, the analysis result shows that the interaction term 
significantly decreases performance (p < .001). It indicates that the positive effect of CSA level 
on performance is reduced when lead VCF’s reputation is high. So, Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported. The result provides even the opposite effect from the expectation with regard to the 
moderation of the lead VCF’s reputation. Figure 4 illustrates the interaction effects of Model 4. 
The figure shows the probit of IPO success according to standardized CSA level under two 
conditions (i.e., a high level of lead VCF reputation and a low level of lead VCF reputation). 
When CSA level is low, a high level of lead VCF reputation is more likely to bring IPO success 
than a low level of lead VCF reputation. But, the increasing likelihood of IPO success from 
increasing CSA level in the condition of a high level of lead VCF reputation is lower than the 
one in the condition of a low level of lead VCF reputation. After a threshold, this situation is 
changed, as shown in Figure 3. As CSA level becomes high, a low level of lead VCF reputation 
is more likely to bring IPO success than a high level of lead VCF reputation. The increasing 
likelihood of IPO success from increasing CSA level in the condition of a low level of lead VCF 
reputation is still higher than the one in the condition of a high level of lead VCF reputation. 
Lead VCF reputation is shown to weaken the positive relationship between CSA level and 
performance as does CSA diversity. 
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Model 5 includes all the variables including CSA diversity, lead VCF reputation and their 
two interaction terms with CSA level in addition to Model 2. The result is consistent with Model 
3 and 4. Both CSA diversity and lead VCF reputation significantly decrease the positive effect of 
CSA level on performance (p < .001). All the results of these probit models through 2 stage least 
squares approach are presented in Appendices 10 to 13.   
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction Effect on the Venture Company’s IPO Success: CSA  
Level & Lead Firm Reputation 
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V. DISCUSSION  
 
1. Conclusions 
 
This study addressed VCFs’ influences on performance in the context of VC syndication. 
First of all, this study demonstrated that a venture company’ network (i.e., its VCFs and the ties 
with them) plays a critical role in its performance. A venture company’s performance is, of 
course, driven by its quality such as the entrepreneurs, knowledge, technology, and initial 
resources. Nevertheless, this study showed that its partners affect its performance, too. More 
specifically, who the partners are both in the global network (i.e., CSA within the whole VCFs’ 
network) and in the local network (i.e., CSA diversity within each syndicate) was demonstrated 
to impact a venture company’s performance. 
As well as three main predictors, several control variables are noteworthy as meaningful 
determinants of performance. First, the invested money, the length of investment, and the 
number of VCFs were shown to increase performance. This result suggests that non-financial 
support contributes to a venture company’s performance, as well as financial support does. 
Second, the significance of patent possession is a reminder of intellectual properties’ importance 
as an indicator of a company’s overall capabilities. The coefficient of the patent variable in 
Model 1 indicates that possessing any patent contributed to a venture company’s IPO success 
more than any other factors. Meanwhile, some factors negatively affected syndicate 
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performance. Contrary to the expectation, the number of investment rounds was shown to 
decrease the syndicate’s performance. This means that a venture company that receives financial 
support at multiple rounds is less likely to do an IPO. I expect that this result was from a VCFs’ 
tendency to adopt an option with lower risks. In particular, if a venture company is considered 
more promising and less risky than others, VCFs will provide sufficient resources at earlier 
stages to obtain initiatives in the investment. But, if VCFs choose to support a venture company 
of which potential is less certain and more risky, they will provide financial resources at multiple 
rounds. In this case, the venture company may have less likelihood of doing an IPO than a 
venture company that could convince the investors of its potential and receive sufficient support 
at earlier rounds. Conversely, a large number of investment rounds may not be a positive signal 
to some potential investors. It can be understood that VCFs which support a venture company 
through a lot of rounds are not quite confident about the company’s future. This leads to a lower 
likelihood of the company’s IPO success. Moreover, nationality was demonstrated to work as a 
determinant of performance. As explained in the result part, this result means that venture 
companies located in a country where the U.S. VCFs (i.e., 78.56% of all the VCFs during the 
period) will have difficulties in their investment tend to obtain higher performance. I expect that 
this result comes from the excellence of the companies chosen by VCFs in spite of the 
difficulties they might have in the investment. For instance, if a VC syndicate from the U.S. 
decides to support a venture company located in a country which they cannot easily invest 
because of distance in geography, language, and culture, it means that the company is regarded 
as possessing highly promising capabilities. Its potential capabilities will be able to bring an IPO 
success to it. In other words, the high likelihood of IPO success that a venture company in a 
minor country had can be understood as its higher potentials that would attract their investors. 
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The analysis with control variables also confirmed that a venture company’s industry affects its 
performance. In particular, a venture company in the communication industry showed a lower 
likelihood of IPO success than other industry companies. The other four industry groups showed 
no significant effect on a player’s IPO success in their industries. Additionally, a venture 
company that received its final round support from 1999 to 2000 showed less likelihood of IPO 
success. Perhaps, this result can be understood as investments that were conducted less carefully 
in this buoyant period.  
This study focused on the relationship between a syndicate’s CSA level and its 
performance. First of all, a syndicate’s CSA level was hypothesized to increase the syndicate’s 
performance. As CSA brings superior information, better cooperation, and a higher level of 
power to the focal actor, CSA of a VC syndicate was considered to increase the syndicate’s 
performance through these benefits. The analysis results confirmed that CSA level is positively 
associated with syndicate performance, as expected. If a VC syndicate holds higher level of CSA 
(i.e., more partners with which the syndicate forms direct relationships, higher level of brokerage 
through more structural holes, and higher level of power), the venture company it supports has a 
higher likelihood of IPO success. Furthermore, this study suggested two moderating factors 
impacting the relationship between CSA level and performance. The first factor (i.e., CSA 
diversity) weakened the positive effect of CSA level on performance, supporting the hypothesis. 
However, the second factor (i.e., lead VCF reputation) also weakened the positive effect, which 
was the opposite from the theoretical expectation.  
CSA diversity was hypothesized to decrease the positive effect of CSA level on 
performance. As mentioned above, I explained this with two categories (i.e., the condition where 
CSA level is low and the condition where CSA level is high). In the former condition, as a 
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syndicate’s CSA level is low, the majority of the syndicate members hold low levels of CSA. 
They want to form ties with prestigious partners that tend to have high CSA, as they expect both 
benefits from the partners’ higher levels of R&Cs and from status increase. Thus, they are more 
willing to cooperate within the syndicate. This tendency decreases overall coordination costs 
from CSA diversity within the syndicate. Moreover, they tend to be more willing to accept novel 
and different ideas as they have an intention to enhance their current position. Because they are 
the majority of the syndicate, the dominant atmosphere of the syndicate becomes to encourage 
difference and diversity. The syndicate can enhance the benefits resulting from CSA diversity. 
Therefore, the contribution of CSA diversity to performance becomes higher than in the other 
condition. In the latter condition, as CSA level of a syndicate is high, the majority of the 
syndicate members hold high levels of CSA. They tend to possess higher levels of R&Cs and 
they are less willing to accept novel and different ideas for fear of losing their current high status. 
The dominant atmosphere of the syndicate becomes to maintain the current norms and traditions. 
They do not take advantage of the benefits from diverse members. Meanwhile, costs from 
diverse members are still incurred in this condition. Costs from diversity are not reduced, while 
its benefits are mitigated. Therefore, when CSA of a syndicate is high, the contribution of CSA 
diversity to performance becomes lower than in the former condition where CSA is low. The 
analysis result confirmed this expectation. Figure 3 presented in the previous part displays this 
result. In the area where CSA is low, performance with low CSA diversity is lower than 
performance with high CSA diversity. In the other area, low CSA diversity brings higher 
performance. 
Figure 5 shows a 2 by 2 matrix about this interaction between CSA level and CSA 
diversity. One example of the first category is a VC syndicate led by Kleiner Perkins Caufield &  
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Figure 5. Four Categories by CSA Level and CSA Diversity  
 
 
  
 
Byers. This syndicate invested in a venture company, Concentric Network from 1995 to 1996. 
This syndicate had high level of CSA and a low degree of CSA diversity. Concentric Network 
held an IPO in 1997. A syndicate in this category is more likely to succeed in terms of the target 
company’s IPO than syndicates in any other categories. A syndicate in the fourth category is 
least likely to succeed. Planning & Logic, Inc. was supported by a syndicate in this category. 
Although the syndicate was led by Mayfield Fund, one of the most prominent VCFs in the U.S., 
the company could not succeed in term of IPO. Syndicates in category 2 and category 3 will have 
moderate likelihoods of IPO success compared to syndicates in category 1 and category 4. 
Although there are many factors impacting the IPO success of a venture company, the interaction 
49 
 
between CSA level and CSA diversity within a VC syndicate seems to make another critical 
effect on the venture company supported by the syndicate. 
Figure 6 is about each cumulative probability of IPO success affected by CSA level in 
both conditions (i.e., low CSA diversity and high CSA diversity). The figure shows that a high 
degree of CSA diversity enhances the IPO success likelihood more than low degree of CSA 
diversity, when the syndicate’s CSA level is low. Meanwhile, when the syndicate’s CSA level is 
high, a low degree of CSA diversity enhances the IPO success likelihood more than high degree 
of CSA diversity. 
 
 
Figure 6. Cumulative Probability of IPO Success affected by the interaction between CSA 
level and CSA diversity  
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Unlike CSA diversity, the direction of the moderation by the lead VCF’s reputation was 
the opposite from the theoretical expectation. As Figure 4 in the result section presents, in the 
area where CSA level is low, performance with a reputable leader is higher than performance 
with a less reputable leader. Meanwhile, in the other area where CSA level is high, performance 
with a reputable leader is lower than performance with a less reputable leader. In the theoretical 
part, I hypothesized that the lead VCF’s reputation strengthens the positive effect of the 
syndicate’s CSA level on syndicate performance. I considered that the lead VCF’s reputation 
would provide a kind of legitimacy as it signals higher capabilities of the leader. So, the 
reputation was expected to reduce difficulty in the coordination of VCFs. If non-lead VCFs have 
higher levels of CSA and possess more knowledge, power and experience, the positive effect of 
the lead VCF’ reputation was regarded to be larger. But, the opposite result the analysis provided 
seems to imply that the more reputable the lead VCF, the lower the positive effect of CSA level. 
As explained above, there are two conditions in terms of CSA level (i.e., low CSA level and high 
CSA level). First, when CSA level is low, the result shows that performance with a reputable 
leader is higher than performance with a less reputable leader. In this condition, the majority of 
the non-lead VCFs have low levels of CSA and they will be more cooperative to a reputable lead 
VCF for both benefits from the leader’s higher level of R&Cs and from status increase through 
future syndication with the leader. So, there will be less conflict within the syndicate. 
Coordination will be easier for this reputable lead VCF. With the reduced difficulty in 
coordination, this syndicate will be able to obtain higher performance than similar syndicates led 
by a VCF with low reputation. In this condition, the positive effect of the lead VCF’s reputation 
becomes meaningful. In contrary, in the condition where CSA level is high, the result shows that 
performance with a reputable leader is lower than performance with a less reputable leader. In 
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this condition, the majority of the non-lead VCFs have high levels of CSA and they tend to 
possess high levels of knowledge, power, and experience as well as network position. If this 
syndicate is led by a reputable VCF, there may be conflicts for initiatives between the reputable 
VCF and other non-lead VCFs. In a similar condition, status conflicts among members was 
shown to decrease the team’s performance (Groysberg, Polzer, & Elfenbein, 2011; Bendersky & 
Hays, 2012). These conflicts may lead to dysfunctional and counterproductive behaviors within 
the group. Also, among lots of powerful members, there can be confusion between power 
hierarchy and status hierarchy and it can lead to a dysfunctional effect on performance (Ma, 
Rhee, & Yang 2012). So to speak, a syndicate composed of VCFs with high levels of CSA may 
not need a reputable lead VCF as they already possess knowledge, power, experience, and 
network position that are required for supporting a venture company. Simultaneously, the lead 
VCF might be less likely to accept the contribution of the non-lead VCFs to its syndicate as it 
assumes that similar support is already given by the lead VCF itself. Through these possible 
conflicts, I expect that performance with a reputable leader becomes lower than performance 
with a less-reputable leader in this condition, as shown in the result.  
Figure 7 shows a 2 by 2 matrix about this interaction between CSA level and lead VCF 
reputation. On example of the first category is a VC syndicate led by Information Technology 
Ventures. This syndicate invested in a venture company, Epiphany Incorporation from 1997 to 
1999. Although this syndicate had high level of CSA, Information Technology Ventures did not 
possess a high level of reputation at that time. In spite of this weakness, Epiphany Incorporation 
succeeded in its IPO in 1999. A syndicate in this category is more likely to succeed in terms of 
the target company’s IPO than syndicates in any other categories. Meanwhile, a syndicate in the 
fourth category is least likely to succeed. This category players’ lower likelihood of IPO success  
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Figure 7. Four Categories by CSA Level and Lead VCF Reputation 
  
 
 
 
than others makes sense if low CSA level and low reputation of the lead VCF are considered. A 
syndicate in the third category is less likely to succeed than a syndicate in the second category. 
Although Mayfield Fund supported as the lead VCF both Focal Incorporation from 1991 to 1996 
and MaterniCare Incorporation from 1994 to 1999, performance differed. The former company 
succeeded in its IPO in 1997, while the latter failed. In this case, the difference between the CSA 
levels of two syndicates seemed to work as one critical factor. 
Figure 8 is about each cumulative probability of IPO success affected by CSA level in 
both conditions (i.e., low reputation of a lead VCF and high reputation of a lead VCF). The 
figure shows that a reputable lead VCF enhances the IPO success likelihood more than a less 
reputable lead VCF, when the syndicate’s CSA level is low. However, the tendency is changed, 
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when the syndicate’s CSA level is high. A less reputable lead VCF enhances the IPO success 
likelihood more than a reputable lead VCF. 
 
 
Figure 8. Cumulative Probability of IPO Success affected by the interaction between CSA 
level and Lead VCF Reputation  
 
 
 
 
 
2. Contributions and Implications 
 
This study makes three theoretical contributions. First, this study contributes to social 
network research. Instead of examining the individual effects of specific network attributes that 
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we already know are associated with distinct outcomes, this study focused on CSA viewed as 
comprehensive advantage a structural position brings in its entirety. Previous research about 
network advantage has addressed it as overall benefits originated from holding a network 
position without suggesting how to concretely measure it. Although some measures have been 
adopted as this construct, there has not been a widely-accepted measure for it. I conducted a 
factor analysis with brokerage, direct ties, and power centrality and confirmed this measure’s 
validity as a determinant of performance. Then, I suggested the factor to be called as CSA. 
Moreover, this study investigated CSA at the syndicate level unlike previous research which has 
examined CSA at the unitary actor level (i.e., the levels of individual and organization). A 
syndicate’s CSA was demonstrated to affect its performance positively, as do CSAs of an 
individual and an organization. Besides, this study found that two moderating factors (i.e., CSA 
diversity and the lead firm reputation) govern this positive relationship. Second, it extends the 
understanding of diversity research by introducing CSA diversity. By examining a syndicate’s 
diversity in terms of CSA, this study demonstrated that this type of diversity within a syndicate is 
a meaningful factor to the syndicate, which impacts the relationship between CSA level and 
performance. Third, this study directs attention to the lead organization as another determinant of 
syndicate performance. The analyses confirmed the lead organization’s importance to its 
syndicate by demonstrating the moderating effect of the lead VCF’s reputation on the 
relationship between CSA level and performance. Although this study focused on reputation, 
other attributes of the lead organization and their roles in the syndicate leave much room for 
future research. 
In terms of managerial implications, this study can help VCFs with their syndicate 
management. First, managers in a lead VCF are able to understand what kinds of VCFs should 
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be invited. They will consider potential partners’ CSA levels as critical when they form a 
syndicate. Moreover, if they are aware of the syndicate’s current CSA level, they will be able to 
differentiate the target in terms of the syndicate’s CSA diversity, according to the level. When 
the level is low, the lead VCF may consider inviting a VCF which will increase the syndicate’s 
CSA diversity. On contrary, if the level is high, the lead VCF will need to keep the syndicate’s 
CSA diversity low. More importantly, managers in a reputable lead VCF can understand the 
increasing significance of their coordination role when they form a syndicate with non-lead 
VCFs with high CSA levels. They will have to remember that its reputation may decrease 
performance, particularly as their coordination of these partners can incur higher costs. Second, 
this study also provides a useful guide to managers in a non-lead VCF. For example, if they need 
to join a VC syndicate, they will consider the syndicate’s CSA as a critical determinant of its 
performance. More specifically, they will look into both the level and diversity in terms of CSA. 
They will be able to grasp at a better investment chance by considering not only a venture 
company’s characteristics, but also the potential partners’ characteristics. Taken together, 
managers in both lead VCFs and non-lead VCFs will be able to obtain higher performance 
through the findings of this study. In addition, through this study, both managers of a start-up 
company and potential investors can learn the importance of the composition within a VC 
syndicate to the success of a start-up company the syndicate supports. By considering VC 
syndicate’s CSA and other characteristics, such as diversity and reputation, managers of a start-
up company can make more sophisticated choices if they receive investment offers from multiple 
VC syndicates. Similarly, potential investors will be able to choose a better target if they 
consider these factors in their investment choices. 
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3. Limitations and Future Directions 
 
In interpreting the results of this study, two limitations should be kept in mind. First, the 
CSA measure developed here was based on a sub-set of network attributes. Although I 
conducted the factor analysis with the most commonly used network attributes, future research 
may broaden the set of network attributes that are combined to obtain a more comprehensive 
measure of CSA. For example, the number of indirect ties, efficiency, or the number of networks 
to which a focal actor belongs can be considered as another component of CSA. Second, this 
study addressed only one type of syndicate diversity (i.e., CSA diversity). However, other types 
of diversity may affect performance differently (e.g., organizational type diversity, age diversity, 
size diversity, nationality diversity, and experience diversity). Further, Harrison and Klein (2007) 
suggested three categories of diversity (i.e., separation, variety, and disparity) in their seminal 
study about diversity. These three categories of diversity differ in terms of their representation, 
their effects on performance, and their operationalization. As CSA diversity within a syndicate 
was demonstrated as a meaningful determinant of performance in this study, further research on 
all these various types of syndicate diversity and their effects on performance will provide 
additional insight.  
This study provides several opportunities for future research. First, as a relatively under-
explored concept in social network research, the main theme of this study (i.e., CSA) points to 
promising research opportunities. What are the antecedents of CSA? What are the processes and 
dynamics in obtaining CSA? What are the consequences of CSA? In answering these questions, 
the operationalization of CSA adopted in this study will be helpful. In addition, CSAs at the 
multi-levels and CSAs in multiple networks will help us extend our understanding of networks. 
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For instance, entrepreneurs’ CSA at the individual level and its interactions with VCFs’ CSA at 
the organizational level can be meaningful determinants of performance. Also, as well as CSA in 
the VCFs’ network, CSA in their venture company’s alliance network and interactions between 
the two advantages will be another intriguing theme for future research. 
Second, some factors addressed in this study have much room for further research. The 
type of syndicate members is one of these factors. Models 2 and 4 show that the number of 
syndicate members affiliated with a financial institution is negatively associated with 
performance, while Model 3 presents that the number of corporate VCFs is positively related to 
it. Although the type of VCFs was not the focus of this study, the results imply that the type of 
VCFs can be another critical predictor of syndicate performance. What composition of VCFs 
within a syndicate will bring higher performance to the syndicate? When will corporate VCFs 
and syndicate members affiliated with a financial institution be valuable to the syndicate? What 
stage will be the best for these members to join the syndicate? What interactions among different 
types of VCFs will exist and what effects will they make? Answering these questions will bring 
valuable insights to VC syndicate researchers. In addition, a lead VCF is another factor to be 
further researched. Although this study only addressed the lead VCF’s reputation, other 
characteristics of a lead VCF including status, size, expertise, nationality, and experience will 
need to be examined as important determinants of its syndicate performance. Also, a lead VCF’s 
type can be another determinant associating with its syndicate performance. Though a general 
VCF tends to take a role of a lead VCF within a syndicate, a corporate VCF and a firm affiliated 
with a financial institution may take this role. Will these types of VCFs obtain higher 
performance? Under what conditions will they obtain higher performance? Exploring these 
questions will represent a step forward in syndicate research.  
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Finally, several aspects of a syndicate investment which were not addressed in this study 
are worthy of exploration. For example, in terms of investment performance, different constructs 
can be considered. Though this study focused on the venture company’s IPO success as a 
syndicate’s main performance, selling the company to an established firm (i.e., M&A) is often 
regarded as another success by both the syndicate and the company. Effects of the predictors in 
this study on M&A can be another topic that can bring interesting findings. Will CSA level 
enhance M&A success as it does IPO success? Will CSA diversity and a lead VCF reputation 
moderate the relationship between CSA level and M&A success? What factors will enhance 
M&A success in a VC syndicate investment? Will the factors be consistent in terms of their 
effects on both M&A success and IPO success? Moreover, new product development and patent 
application can be examined as another performance construct of both a venture company and its 
VC syndicate. Furthermore, with regard to investment timing, many interesting questions can be 
examined. For a corporate VCF, what is the best stage to join a VC syndicate? For an investor 
affiliated with a financial institution, what is the best stage? As a reputable VCF, what is the best 
stage? Will the best stage be either earlier or later? As investment rounds are extended, will 
keeping the same members bring higher performance? If new members are considered to join, 
will there be an appropriate number of syndicate members in each stage? If new members are to 
join after several investment rounds, what should be considered to evaluate potential 
newcomers? In conclusion, further studies on all these issues will deepen our understanding in 
the relevant areas including social network, syndicates, and VCFs. 
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VII. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Nationality of Venture Companies 
 
Nationality Frequency Percentage 
Australia 3 0.26 
Belgium 2 0.18 
Bermuda 1 0.09 
Brazil 1 0.09 
Canada 14 1.23 
China 3 0.26 
Denmark 1 0.09 
Finland 2 0.18 
France 9 0.79 
Germany 4 0.35 
Iceland 1 0.09 
India 7 0.62 
Indonesia 1 0.09 
Israel 15 1.32 
Japan 9 0.79 
Malaysia 1 0.09 
Mexico 1 0.09 
Netherlands 7 0.62 
Poland 1 0.09 
Singapore 6 0.53 
South Korea 6 0.53 
Sweden 2 0.18 
Switzerland 3 0.26 
Taiwan 3 0.26 
United Kingdom 23 2.02 
United States 1,011 88.92 
Total 1,137 100% 
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Appendix 2. IPO success and the Venture Company’s Nationality 
 
Nationality  Failure in IPO Success in IPO Success Rate (%) 
Australia 2 1 33.3 
Belgium 2 0 0.0 
Bermuda 0 1 100.0 
Brazil 1 0 0.0 
Canada 13 1 7.1 
China 3 0 0.0 
Denmark 1 0 0.0 
Finland 1 1 50.0 
France 6 3 33.3 
Germany 4 0 0.0 
Iceland 1 0 0.0 
India 6 1 14.3 
Indonesia 0 1 100.0 
Israel 11 4 26.7 
Japan 4 5 55.6 
Malaysia 1 0 0.0 
Mexico 1 0 0.0 
Netherlands 5 2 28.6 
Poland 1 0 0.0 
Singapore 5 1 16.7 
South Korea 6 0 0.0 
Sweden 1 1 50.0 
Switzerland 0 3 100.0 
Taiwan 1 2 66.7 
United Kingdom 21 2 8.7 
United States 841 170 16.8 
Total 938 199 17.5 % 
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Appendix 3. Industry of Venture Companies 
 
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Internet Specific 338 29.73 
Computer Software 281 24.71 
Communications 150 13.19 
Medical/Health 105 9.23 
Semiconductor/Electricity 72 6.33 
Computer Hardware 51 4.49 
Biotechnology 42 3.69 
Consumer Related 40 3.52 
Industrial/Energy 18 1.58 
Financial Services 10 0.88 
Business Services 8 0.70 
Computer Other 7 0.62 
Manufacturing 5 0.44 
Transportation 4 0.35 
Agriculture/ Forestry/ Fishery 3 0.26 
Other 2 0.18 
Utilities 1 0.09 
Total 1,137 100 
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Appendix 4. IPO Success and the Venture Company’s Industry 
 
Industry Failure in IPO Success in IPO Success Rate (%) 
Internet Specific 290 48 14.2 
Computer Software 229 52 18.5 
Communications 127 23 15.3 
Medical/Health 84 21 20.0 
Semiconductor/ Electricity 58 14 19.4 
Computer Hardware 45 6 11.8 
Biotechnology 26 16 38.1 
Consumer Related 34 6 15.0 
Industrial/Energy 12 6 33.3 
Financial Services 8 2 20.0 
Business Services 6 2 25.0 
Computer Other 5 2 28.6 
Manufacturing 4 1 20.0 
Transportation 4 0 0.0 
Agriculture/ Forestry/ Fishery 3 0 0.0 
Other 2 0 0.0 
Utilities 1 0 0.0 
Total 938 199 17.5% 
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 Appendix 5. IPO Success and the Number of VCFs within a Syndicate 
 
# of VCFs  Failure in IPO Success in IPO Success Rate (%) 
2 144 20 12.2 
3 207 24 10.4 
4 158 24 13.2 
5 109 15 12.1 
6 85 18 17.5 
7 69 19 21.6 
8 48 12 20.0 
9 29 12 29.3 
10 22 12 35.3 
11 13 8 38.1 
12 16 6 27.3 
13 13 8 38.1 
14 11 6 35.3 
15 4 4 50.0 
16 4 1 20.0 
17 2 4 66.7 
18 2 2 50.0 
19 0 2 100.0 
20 1 0 0.0 
21 1 1 50.0 
22 0 1 100.0 
Total 938 199 17.5% 
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Appendix 6. IPO Success and the Number of Corporate VCFs within a Syndicate 
 
# of Corporate VCFs  Failure in IPO Success in IPO Success Rate (%) 
0 601 109 15.4 
1 205 39 16.0 
2 82 28 25.5 
3 29 12 29.3 
4 14 3 17.6 
5 5 2 28.6 
6 0 3 100.0 
7 1 2 66.7 
8 1 1 50.0 
Total 938 199 17.5% 
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Appendix 7. IPO Success and the Number of Financial Affiliates within a Syndicate 
 
# of Financial Affiliates  Failure in IPO Success in IPO Success Rate (%) 
0 704 127 15.3 
1 171 44 20.5 
2 41 20 32.8 
3 15 6 28.6 
4 3 2 40.0 
5 2 0 0.0 
6 2 0 0.0 
Total 938 199 17.5% 
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Appendix 8. Results of Factor Analyses from 1990 to 2000 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1990 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =       97 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.59369      2.49248            0.9814       0.9814 
        Factor2  |      0.10121      0.15330            0.0383       1.0197 
        Factor3  |     -0.05209            .           -0.0197       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  348.78 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1991 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =       87 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.72953      2.69722            1.0027       1.0027 
        Factor2  |      0.03231      0.07186            0.0119       1.0145 
        Factor3  |     -0.03955            .           -0.0145       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  366.05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1992 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      207 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.67326      2.58513            0.9830       0.9830 
        Factor2  |      0.08813      0.12991            0.0324       1.0154 
        Factor3  |     -0.04178            .           -0.0154       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  838.01 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Appendix 8. Results of Factor Analyses from 1990 to 2000 (cont.) 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1993 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      272 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.69875      2.55759            0.9600       0.9600 
        Factor2  |      0.14117      0.16994            0.0502       1.0102 
        Factor3  |     -0.02877            .           -0.0102       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 1222.80 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1994 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      302 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.67941      2.53746            0.9606       0.9606 
        Factor2  |      0.14195      0.17396            0.0509       1.0115 
        Factor3  |     -0.03201            .           -0.0115       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 1310.18 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1995 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      542 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.62222      2.50287            0.9717       0.9717 
        Factor2  |      0.11936      0.16237            0.0442       1.0159 
        Factor3  |     -0.04302            .           -0.0159       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 2121.77 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Appendix 8. Results of Factor Analyses from 1990 to 2000 (cont.) 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1996 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      763 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.57666      2.46311            0.9768       0.9768 
        Factor2  |      0.11355      0.16589            0.0430       1.0198 
        Factor3  |     -0.05235            .           -0.0198       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 2759.47 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1997 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     1152 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.53449      2.35541            0.9498       0.9498 
        Factor2  |      0.17908      0.22410            0.0671       1.0169 
        Factor3  |     -0.04502            .           -0.0169       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 4255.45 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1998 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     1486 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.45044      2.21416            0.9298       0.9298 
        Factor2  |      0.23628      0.28760            0.0897       1.0195 
        Factor3  |     -0.05132            .           -0.0195       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 5080.53 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Appendix 8. Results of Factor Analyses from 1990 to 2000 (cont.) 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 1999 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     3344 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.36110      2.11098            0.9268       0.9268 
        Factor2  |      0.25013      0.31387            0.0982       1.0250 
        Factor3  |     -0.06375            .           -0.0250       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 1.0e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments in 2000 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     7867 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.27571      1.98550            0.9134       0.9134 
        Factor2  |      0.29021      0.36459            0.1165       1.0299 
        Factor3  |     -0.07438            .           -0.0299       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 2.2e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Investments from 1990 to 2000 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =    16119 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.31641      2.07952            0.9345       0.9345 
        Factor2  |      0.23689      0.31152            0.0956       1.0301 
        Factor3  |     -0.07463            .           -0.0301       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 4.6e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Appendix 9. Result of Probit Regression with Controls (Model 1) 
 
Probit Regression                                               Number of obs   =       1137 
                                                                LR chi2(18)     =     460.10 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -297.2433                                      Pseudo R2       =     0.4363 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
IPO of the Venture Company |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Invested Money             |   .2763091   .0872591     3.17   0.002     .1052845    .4473338 
Length of Investment       |   .3487307   .0775052     4.50   0.000     .1968234     .500638 
# of Investment Rounds     |  -.1952357   .0906919    -2.15   0.031    -.3729886   -.0174829 
# of Participating VCFs    |    .199653    .092984     2.15   0.032     .0174077    .3818984 
# of Corporate VCFs        |   .0469217   .0671607     0.70   0.485    -.0847109    .1785543 
# of  Financial Affiliates |  -.0651834   .0675585    -0.96   0.335    -.1975956    .0672288 
Experience of VCFs         |   .0657331   .0674957     0.97   0.330     -.066556    .1980222 
Lead VCF’s Centrality      |  -.1108926   .0605101    -1.83   0.067    -.2294903    .0077051 
Lead VCF’s Foreignness     |   .1616748   .2410057     0.67   0.502    -.3106877    .6340374 
Patent                     |   3.377155   .3227472    10.46   0.000     2.744582    4.009728 
Company's Nationality      |  -.2575193   .0733194    -3.51   0.000    -.4012227    -.113816 
Bio/ Medical Industry      |   .1087642    .202114     0.54   0.590    -.2873719    .5049003 
Software Industry          |   .1038068   .1721745     0.60   0.547     -.233649    .4412627 
Internet Industry          |   .2186518   .1863401     1.17   0.241    -.1465681    .5838717 
Communication Industry     |  -.5318583   .2510333    -2.12   0.034    -1.023875   -.0398421 
Investment in California   |  -.0540288   .1269143    -0.43   0.670    -.3027762    .1947186 
Period (1995-1998)         |  -.2735836    .211254    -1.30   0.195     -.687634    .1404667 
Period (1999-2000)         |  -.9620105   .2260927    -4.25   0.000    -1.405144   -.5188771 
                  Constant |  -.7738127    .228553    -3.39   0.001    -1.221768   -.3258571 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 10. Result of Probit Regression through 2SLS approach with the Independent Variable of CSA Level (Model 2) 
 
Probit model with endogenous regressors                         Number of obs   =       1137 
                                                                Wald chi2(18)   =    1014.30 
Log likelihood = -1650.0704                                     Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
IPO of the Venture Company |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSA Level                  |   1.146101   .0924455    12.40   0.000     .9649117    1.327291 
Invested Money             |  -.1053399   .0707852    -1.49   0.137    -.2440764    .0333965 
Length of Investment       |   .3492708   .0654554     5.34   0.000     .2209806    .4775611 
# of Investment Rounds     |   .0029476   .0683865     0.04   0.966    -.1310876    .1369827 
# of Participating VCFs    |   .3161842   .0629394     5.02   0.000     .1928252    .4395432 
# of Corporate VCFs        |  -.0013384   .0447396    -0.03   0.976    -.0890264    .0863496 
# of Financial Affiliates  |  -.2745784   .0450872    -6.09   0.000    -.3629477   -.1862091 
Experience of VCFs         |  -.1152167   .0439144    -2.62   0.009    -.2012873   -.0291461 
Lead VCF’s Centrality      |  -.5243482   .0446655   -11.74   0.000     -.611891   -.4368054 
Lead VCF’s Foreignness     |   .1223613   .1685955     0.73   0.468    -.2080798    .4528024 
Patent                     |   1.343205   .5448267     2.47   0.014     .2753642    2.411046 
Bio/ Medical Industry      |   .0873001   .1283548     0.68   0.496    -.1642706    .3388708 
Software Industry          |   .0868191    .108843     0.80   0.425    -.1265092    .3001474 
Internet Industry          |    .118398   .1181517     1.00   0.316    -.1131752    .3499711 
Communication Industry     |  -.3288111   .1556918    -2.11   0.035    -.6339614   -.0236608 
Investment in California   |  -.1272558   .0779696    -1.63   0.103    -.2800733    .0255618 
Period (1995-1998)         |  -.0151623   .1472363    -0.10   0.918    -.3037402    .2734156 
Period (1999-2000)         |  -.5790687   .1859799    -3.11   0.002    -.9435825   -.2145548 
                  Constant |  -.1782766   .2079261    -0.86   0.391    -.5858044    .2292511 
---------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   /athrho |  -1.563819   .4190258    -3.73   0.000    -2.385095   -.7425439 
                  /lnsigma |  -.2290992   .0209703   -10.92   0.000    -.2702002   -.1879982 
---------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    rho |   -.916037   .0674112               -.983185   -.6306797 
                  sigma |   .7952496   .0166766               .7632266    .8286162 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) = 13.93        Prob > chi2 = 0.0002 
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Appendix 11. Result of Probit Regression through 2SLS approach with the Interaction Term between CSA Level  
and CSA Diversity (Model 3) 
 
Probit model with endogenous regressors                         Number of obs   =       1137 
                                                                Wald chi2(20)   =    1070.21 
Log likelihood = -1293.1284                                     Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
IPO of the Venture Company |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSA Level                  |   1.550202   .1299136    11.93   0.000     1.295576    1.804828 
CSA Diversity              |   .0183084   .0323478     0.57   0.571     -.045092    .0817089 
CSA Level * CSA Diversity  |  -1.236585    .132801    -9.31   0.000     -1.49687   -.9762998 
Invested Money             |  -.1238505   .0702139    -1.76   0.078    -.2614671    .0137662 
Length of Investment       |   .2944219   .0674464     4.37   0.000     .1622294    .4266144 
# of Investment Rounds     |   .0182312   .0679954     0.27   0.789    -.1150374    .1514997 
# of Participating VCFs    |   .9643761   .0856891    11.25   0.000     .7964285    1.132324 
# of Corporate VCFs        |   .1107095   .0432817     2.56   0.011     .0258789    .1955401 
# of Financial Affiliates  |  -.0744804   .0453182    -1.64   0.100    -.1633024    .0143416 
Experience of VCFs         |  -.1863429   .0459792    -4.05   0.000    -.2764606   -.0962253 
Lead VCF’s Centrality      |  -.4649326    .042142   -11.03   0.000    -.5475294   -.3823358 
Lead VCF’s Foreignness     |   .1942269   .1602354     1.21   0.225    -.1198287    .5082826 
Patent                     |   1.313677   .5341025     2.46   0.014     .2668557    2.360499 
Bio/ Medical Industry      |   .1229548   .1256269     0.98   0.328    -.1232693     .369179 
Software Industry          |   .0463646   .1069682     0.43   0.665    -.1632893    .2560184 
Internet Industry          |   .0700634   .1169962     0.60   0.549     -.159245    .2993718 
Communication Industry     |  -.4746978   .1461659    -3.25   0.001    -.7611777   -.1882178 
Investment in California   |  -.1687876   .0755938    -2.23   0.026    -.3169488   -.0206265 
Period (1995-1998)         |   .0886557   .1473729     0.60   0.547    -.2001898    .3775012 
Period (1999-2000)         |  -.3237732   .1981177    -1.63   0.102    -.7120768    .0645304 
                  Constant |  -.2840296   .1979359    -1.43   0.151    -.6719769    .1039177 
---------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   /athrho |  -1.653107   .4445039    -3.72   0.000    -2.524318   -.7818951 
                  /lnsigma |  -.5415577   .0209703   -25.82   0.000    -.5826588   -.5004567 
---------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       rho |  -.9292827   .0606453                     -.9872457   -.6537931 
                     sigma |   .5818412   .0122014                      .5584117    .6062537 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) =  13.83                 Prob > chi2 = 0.0002 
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Appendix 12. Result of Probit Regression through 2SLS approach with the Interaction Term between CSA Level  
and the Lead Firm Reputation (Model 4) 
 
Probit model with endogenous regressors                          Number of obs   =       1137 
Wald chi2(20)   =    1023.35 
Log likelihood = -1282.4891                                      Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
IPO of the Venture Company  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSA Level                   |   1.624543   .1157514    14.03   0.000     1.397674    1.851412 
Lead VCF Reputation         |   .5685187   .0653654     8.70   0.000     .4404048    .6966326 
CSA Level * LVCF Reputation |  -1.193881   .0860885   -13.87   0.000    -1.362611    -1.02515 
Invested Money              |  -.0898844   .0703918    -1.28   0.202    -.2278498     .048081 
Length of Investment        |   .2606712   .0690499     3.78   0.000     .1253359    .3960064 
# of Investment Rounds      |  -.0344721    .067714    -0.51   0.611    -.1671891     .098245 
# of Participating VCFs     |   .3487392   .0636512     5.48   0.000     .2239851    .4734934 
# of Corporate VCFs         |  -.0435269   .0455881    -0.95   0.340     -.132878    .0458241 
# of Financial Affiliates   |  -.2517058   .0450004    -5.59   0.000    -.3399049   -.1635067 
Experience of VCFs          |   -.105912   .0439776    -2.41   0.016    -.1921066   -.0197174 
Lead VCF’s Centrality       |  -.6959821   .0599775   -11.60   0.000     -.813536   -.5784283 
Lead VCF’s Foreignness      |   .2931746    .165699     1.77   0.077    -.0315894    .6179386 
Patent                      |   1.319639    .562567     2.35   0.019     .2170284     2.42225 
Bio/ Medical Industry       |    .036317   .1293758     0.28   0.779    -.2172548    .2898889 
Software Industry           |   .0165277   .1101614     0.15   0.881    -.1993847    .2324401 
Internet Industry           |    .037296    .120048     0.31   0.756    -.1979938    .2725857 
Communication Industry      |  -.3585065   .1585628    -2.26   0.024    -.6692839   -.0477291 
Investment in California    |  -.0516761   .0794676    -0.65   0.516    -.2074297    .1040775 
Period (1995-1998)          |   .0590243    .148899     0.40   0.692    -.2328123    .3508609 
Period (1999-2000)          |  -.2703444   .1962992    -1.38   0.168    -.6550838     .114395 
Constant |   -.404991   .2071512    -1.96   0.051    -.8109999     .001018 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
/athrho |  -1.544021   .4214393    -3.66   0.000    -2.370027    -.718015 
/lnsigma |  -.5509371   .0209703   -26.27   0.000    -.5920381    -.509836 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
rho |  -.9127935   .0702994                      -.982675   -.6156782 
Sigma |   .5764094   .0120875                      .5531987    .6005941 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) =  13.42                   Prob > chi2 = 0.0002 
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Appendix 13. Result of Probit Regression through 2SLS approach with all the variables and the Interaction Terms (Model 5) 
 
Probit model with endogenous regressors                         Number of obs   =       1137 
                                                                Wald chi2(22)   =    1007.65 
Log likelihood = -981.41194                                     Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
IPO of the Venture Company  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSA Level                   |   2.059387   .1663879    12.38   0.000     1.733273    2.385502 
CSA Diversity               |  -.0095034   .0326802    -0.29   0.771    -.0735554    .0545486 
CSA Level * CSA Diversity   |   -1.16791   .1368193    -8.54   0.000    -1.436071   -.8997494 
Lead VCF Reputation         |   .5302752   .0651505     8.14   0.000     .4025826    .6579678 
CSA Level * LVCF Reputation |  -1.136527   .0859249   -13.23   0.000    -1.304937   -.9681174 
Invested Money              |  -.1142253   .0717866    -1.59   0.112    -.2549245    .0264739 
Length of Investment        |   .2348594   .0699411     3.36   0.001     .0977773    .3719414 
# of Investment Rounds      |  -.0188598   .0684475    -0.28   0.783    -.1530145    .1152949 
# of Participating VCFs     |   .9825137   .0901983    10.89   0.000     .8057283    1.159299 
# of Corporate VCFs         |    .062663   .0443831     1.41   0.158    -.0243262    .1496522 
# of Financial Affiliates   |  -.0824437   .0464476    -1.77   0.076    -.1734792    .0085918 
Experience of VCFs          |  -.1813162   .0475163    -3.82   0.000    -.2744465   -.0881859 
Lead VCF’s Centrality       |  -.6562435   .0598523   -10.96   0.000    -.7735518   -.5389351 
Lead VCF’s Foreignness      |   .3606176   .1600387     2.25   0.024     .0469475    .6742878 
Patent                      |   1.370873   .5488024     2.50   0.012     .2952396    2.446505 
Bio/ Medical Industry       |   .0816029    .128807     0.63   0.526    -.1708542      .33406 
Software Industry           |  -.0146223   .1102695    -0.13   0.895    -.2307466    .2015019 
Internet Industry           |   .0014213   .1209767     0.01   0.991    -.2356888    .2385313 
Communication Industry      |  -.5154209   .1514103    -3.40   0.001    -.8121796   -.2186623 
Investment in California    |  -.1030576   .0781695    -1.32   0.187     -.256267    .0501518 
Period (1995-1998)          |   .1529999   .1513309     1.01   0.312    -.1436033    .4496031 
Period (1999-2000)          |  -.0819291   .2083942    -0.39   0.694    -.4903741     .326516 
                   Constant |   -.502438   .1993656    -2.52   0.012    -.8931874   -.1116886 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    /athrho |   -1.55911   .4200829    -3.71   0.000    -2.382457   -.7357623 
                   /lnsigma |  -.8146834   .0209703   -38.85   0.000    -.8557845   -.7735824 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        rho |  -.9152761   .0681667                     -.9830968    -.626578 
                      sigma |   .4427795   .0092852                      .4249497    .4613573 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) =    13.77                Prob > chi2 = 0.0002 
 
